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Abstract
This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. We characterize
the set of optimal constitutional rules under diﬀerent assumptions about the degree of
contractual imperfections. Our model explains why constitutions contain diﬀerent
types of rules. In particular, we derive conditions under which it is optimal, in
addition to a standard decision rule (e.g., simple majority), to introduce veto rules
(that block certain types of decisions) and supermajority rules (that allow the veto
rule to be overruled). Our model also explains the existence of amendment rules and
checks and balances.
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A constitution is a social contract that sets out the rules that govern the way a society
makes collective decisions. While these rules are complex and vary from constitution to
constitution, it is possible to point some features that are shared by most constitutions.
All constitutions contain rules that govern how day-to-day decisions are made, with the
most common decision rule being the simple majority rule. In addition to this, many
constitutions have some sort of veto rule that blocks certain changes to the status quo.
This, typically happens when the changes, would violate basic political or economic rights.
Such veto rules are often complemented by an additional rule that allows the veto rule
itself to be overruled, but only in exceptional circumstances. This typically requires that
a stricter test (e.g., the support of a supermajority) than the one implied by the decision
rule must be passed.
Some examples will help clarify what we have in mind. First, the Danish constitution of
1953 states that the right to private property cannot be violated (a veto rule). Nonetheless,
expropriation by the State can take place, but only if a majority of the parliament supports
it and a minority of one-third of the members of the current parliament do not request
that the decision must be conﬁrmed by the parliament again after a new election has taken
place. This eﬀectively allows the veto rule to be circumvented, but only if a stricter test
than that implied by the decision rule (a majority in the current parliament) is passed.
Second, the US constitution contains many provisions designed to protect the rights of
individuals (e.g., freedom of speech) and legislation that challenge these rights can be
overruled by the constitutional court and thus would only pass if they are not deemed
unconstitutional.
In addition, to these types of rules most constitutions also contain amendment rules
that specify how the constitutions itself can be changed. The Danish constitution, for
example, speciﬁes that the constitution can only be changed after it has been conﬁrmed
in a referendum in which at least ﬁfty per cent of those who cast their vote and forty per
cent of all eligible voters support the change.
Finally, whenever constitutions have to regulate societies where clear diﬀerences exist
amongst easily identiﬁable groups, checks and balances exist in that policy making requires
that all (or some) of these groups agree. For example, in the current draft for the European
Union constitution, in certain policy areas (such as foreign policy or defense) decisions
cannot be made without the consent of all member states.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a normative theory that can explain why
constitutions embody a range of diﬀerent procedures and rules. We deliberately abstract
from the agency problems that arise when decision making power is delegated and the
complications that arise when agenda setting powers are allocated. We do so to focus
2on the implications that derive directly from the fact that societies in which individuals
disagree about what should be done nonetheless need to make decisions. This seems to us
to be the fundamental conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s tt h a ta n yc o n s t i t u t i o nw o u l dh a v et od e a lw i t h ,
and understanding why a simple decision procedure such as the majority rule is, typically,
not suﬃcient to enable societies to resolve this conﬂict adequately is of theoretical as well
as of practical importance.
We consider a society with a continuum of individuals who face the task of choosing
between two alternatives A and B.A l t e r n a t i v eB — the status quo — yields the same level
of welfare to all, while alternative A creates winners and losers. The magnitude of the
loss depends on the precise nature of alternative A and in some case — when alternative A
violates certain fundamental rights — the loss is particularly large. At the time when the the
constitutional rules are laid down individuals do not yet know whether they will gain or lose
from alternative A, nor do they know if adoption of alternative A will violate fundamental
rights of those who lose. Thus, the constitution is designed from the original position,
behind a veil of ignorance. The set of constitutional rules that maximizes expected utility
depends on the details of the environment, and in particular on which aspects of the
environment can be veriﬁed ex post. We make a distinction between ex ante and ex
post eﬃciency. A constitution is ex ante eﬃcient if from behind the veil of ignorance all
individuals prefer the constitution to having the status quo for sure, while a constitution is
ex post eﬃcient if a hypothetical social planner, after having learned the nature of proposal
A and distribution of winners and losers from this proposal still prefers the constitution
to having the status quo for sure.
The optimal constitution always embodies ad e c i s i o nr u l ethat speciﬁes how large
a fraction of the population must support alternative A for it to pass. In cases where
it is not possible to verify ex post whether alternative A, if adopted, will violate the
rights of those who lose or not, this is the only constitutional rule and the constitution
is ex ante but not ex post eﬃcient. In many cases, however, it is reasonable to suppose
that whether A would violate some fundamental rights can be veriﬁed ex post. In such
situations, the optimal constitution embodies, in addition to the decision rule, a veto rule
that says that irrispective of the decision rule, alternative A cannot pass if it violates these
(veriﬁable) rights. Interestingly, the veto rule is complemented in the optimal constitution
by a third rule — a supermajority rule. This rule speciﬁes that even if the veto rule applies,
alternative A can be adopted if it commands support from a suﬃciently large fraction of
the population. This constitution is both ex ante and ex post eﬃcient and there is no need
for either amendment rules or for checks and balances.
These additional rules are, therefore, adapted in response to other factors. Amendment
rules that allow a subset of individuals (such as those who stand to gain from proposal A)
to change the original decision and/or veto rule enter the optimal constitution in situations
3where there exist external threats to the welfare of this subset of individuals. When this
threat — say a threat of revolution or some other crisis— varies with circumstances and the
original constitution cannot be made contingent on these circumstances, individuals, from
behind the veil of ignorance, may want to introduce an amendment rule. This rule allows
for constitutional changes to be implemented after it has become clear if the external
threat is credible or not, but only if a suﬃciently large number of individuals support
such amendments. We show that amendment rules provide the ﬂexibility necessary to
adapt the constitution to the changing circumstances, but this ﬂexibility comes at the cost
that it must allocate decision making to a speciﬁc group of individuals (those who would
beneﬁt from the policy) rather than to someone who takes society’s interest as a whole
into account. Therefore, amendment rules are optimal only, from the original position’s
perspective, when the possibility that the threat will be carried out is high enough.
Checks and balances understood as diﬀerent rules for diﬀerent groups of individuals (as
distinguished by wealth levels, geographical location etc.) are desirable in heterogenous
societies where some groups are more likely to suﬀer disproportionately from changes to
the status quo. Our main results here are that heterogeneity needs to be signiﬁcant enough
for checks and balances to be optimal but that veriﬁability of the policy areas in which
there is heterogeneity reduces this eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short literature
review. In Section 3 we introduce our basic collective decision problem. In Section 4 we
take up the issue of optimal constitutional. In section 5 we extend the framework to take
up the issue of constitutional amendment. In section 6, we study the conditions under
which checks and balances should be introduced. Section 7 concludes while ﬁgures are
relegated to an appendix.
2. Related Literature
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the fundamental questions related to
constitutional design.1 In this section, we oﬀer a brief discuss of this literature and relate
our analysis to what has gone before.
• A number of recent papers view constitutions as incomplete social contracts. Within
this framework, [1] show that the optimal choice of a majority rule from behind the
veil of ignorance is determined by a trade-oﬀ between two consideration. On the
one hand, the desire to limit excessive ex post redistribution whereby the majority
expropriates the minority suggest that the majority rule should be strict. On the
other hand, it is desirable to allow enough ﬂexibility to circumvent ex post vested
1The classical work in the area is [4]
4interests that attempt to block socially desirable reforms. This suggests that the
majority rules should be lax.2 [2] propose a related theory of endogenous political
institutions but focus on rules that contain the power of political leaders. They
show that the optimal degree of “insulation” measured as the share of votes needed
to block legislation (or the size of the supermajority needed to pass legislation) is
determined by a trade-oﬀ between allowing the political leader enough leeway to
rule and restricting the scope for misuse of power. Our approach shares with these
papers the assumption that constitutional choices are made from behind the veil of
ignorance, yet our goal is diﬀerent. We want to understand when and why particular
constitutional rules emerge. Thus, rather than analyzing how the strictness of one
particular (decision) rule varies with changes in the economic environment, we are
interested in the broader question of how the set of optimal rules itself varies with
the environment.3 Although our starting point is that constitutions are incomplete
contracts in the sense that they do not necessarily provide a full state-contingent
plan for all future events, we stress that appropriate responses to certain future
events, in particular those that relate to fundamental rights, can be speciﬁed in the
constitution. This is major departure from the previous work, but one, we argue,
that provides valuable insights into the complexity of real world constitutions.
• Some recent papers have argued that constitutions are not written behind the veil of
ignorance but by individuals who know their position in society. This literature nat-
urally focuses on constitutional rules that are self-sustaining. [7], for example, study
a situation where the decision rule used to govern future decisions is itself decided
by the majority rule. They ﬁnd that supermajority rules emerge in an overlapping
generations framework where the young can decide on size of the supermajority that
is going to be used to make decisions when they become old. Assuming that most
public policies introduce immediate costs while beneﬁts arrive later, older voters suf-
fer more from reforms than young voters, and this provides an incentive for young
voters to make the decision rule that is going to apply when they are old strict. [3]
also study the endogenous choice of majority rule in a positive framework and derive
conditions under which voting rules are self-sustaining. At present, we have little
to say about the political economy of constitutional design, although our framework
could be extended to capture some aspect of this.
• We show that checks and balances understood as diﬀerent decision rules applied to
diﬀerent groups of individuals (e.g., as in bicameral systems) can be optimal if there
2This approach has been further developed by [5].
3[1] take steps in this direction by analyzing when it would be desirable to introduction various minority
protection rules such as equal tax rates and tax limits.
5is enough heterogeneity in the population. The function of checks and balances in our
framework is very diﬀerent from that of [8]. They focus on situations where checks
and balances understood as separating decision making power between politicians
can reduce policy agency problems. In our framework, checks and balances provide
protection to groups of voters at risk of experiencing particularly large loses. This is
so because checks and balances in our framework prevents support for alternative A
to be transferred between groups.
• Finally, [6] studies a formal model of constitutional change but assumes that changes
are requested and determines the optimal amendment rules as a function of the
pressures from other forms of change (interpretative interventions through legislation
and the courts or, at the other extreme, the possibility of a complete constitutional
crisis). Our approach here is entirely diﬀerent as we endogenize the possibility of
change though the choice of the constitution itself.
3. Setup
We model a society where there is a status quo policy B and a possible alternative A and
society must choose between them. Thus, A should be interpreted as a reform just as in [2].






wi f x = A and i ∈ W
−yi fx = A, i ∈ WC and c ≤ θ
−zi fx = A, i ∈ WC and c>θ
0 if x = B
where w>0 and z ≥ y>0. The interpretation we apply is as follows: if policy x = B is
chosen, we have a status quo where all individuals obtain zero utility. If x = A is chosen,
some individuals, those who belong to the set W (the “winners"), will get a positive utility
w while all other individuals (the “losers") will get some negative utility. The exact amount
of negative utility that losers get is determined by the variable c which we discuss further
below.
We study the situation where all individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in which
they do not know whether they belong in W or not and what the value of the variable c is.
In this situation, they must select a mechanism (a constitution) which, once individuals
are partitioned between W and W C and once c has been selected, determines whether A
or B obtains. Throughout the paper we assume that there is an independent judiciary
which guarantees that the rules prescribed by the constitution will be enforced. Once the
constitution has been selected, nature determines winners and losers. It ﬁrst selects a value
6p from a distribution F on the unit interval. Then, for each individual i independently,
nature determines whether i ∈ W or not with p =P r ( i ∈ W). Given that we have a
continuum of individuals and given that all draws are independent, p also represents the
fraction of individuals in the population who belong to W. A tt h es a m et i m e ,n a t u r ea l s o
selects the variable c from a distribution G on the interval [a,b] where a ≤ θ ≤ b. We
assume that both F and G have strictly positive densities f and g respectively while
e F (p)=
R p
0 F(x)dx and e G(c)=
R c
a G(x)dx.
Clearly, p represents the fraction of individuals who favor over A over B, while c allows
us to describe diﬀerent possible alternatives to the status quo. If the realization of c
associated with A is such that c ≤ θ then the policy is not too damaging to losers while if
c>θthe consequences for them are more serious.
T os u m m a r i z et h et i m e l i n ei no u rs e t u pw eh a v e :
1. Behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional designer)
chooses the constitution.
2. Nature selects p and c. c is observed by everyone.
3. Given p,t h es e t sW and W C are determined.
4. Individuals vote for or against A. The vote result is observed by everyone.
5. The policy x is determined according to the constitution.
While we assume that c is selected and observable at the same time as p is selected, all
we need is that it be observable by the time the policy is determined and so in particular
we could also have assumed that W and WC are selected before c is realized. This would
follow an interpretation where A is not a single policy but a whole program of policies
that all beneﬁt a particular group of individuals where before c is realized individuals are
still uncertain about exactly which policies this program will entail. This issue is discussed
further when we take up constitutional change.
Also, as we discuss further below, while the veriﬁability of votes by a independent court
is a relatively mild assumption in a democracy, the veriﬁability of c is a more delicate
issue. At this point, all we wish to require is that if there is veriﬁability for any of the two
variables, this also be in place by the time policy is determined.
All the assumptions above generate a setup where many important features of the
collective decision problems actual societies face are absent. In particular, this is a model
of direct democracy so that all the agency issues implies by the relationship between
politicians and their constituencies are not dealt with here. Also, in our setup the only
7heterogeneity amongst policies is that generated by the random variable c so that in eﬀect
we have only two kinds of alternatives which diﬀer by the degree of losses inﬂicted upon
losers. This means that we do not deal with the agenda setting problem nor does the
problem of Condorcet cycles arise (see [1]). Indeed, the purpose of our setup is to study
what constitutional mechanisms naturally arise as solutions to even the simplest collective
decision problem.
Also, our approach is normative and this for a variety of reasons. Firstly, this assump-
tion maps nicely with the notion that constitutional designers are “founding fathers". If
the individuals who design constitutions suﬃciently care about the future, they will be
careful not to design a constitution that makes either too easy or too diﬃcult to select
reforms because while they might be, for example, winners from today’s reforms, they
might be losers from tomorrows reforms. In fact, it is fairly easy to show that in inﬁnitely
repeated versions of the decision problem described here, as long as the constitutional
designers care suﬃciently about the future, the main results obtained in the paper still
apply even if the designers know whether they are winners or losers at the present time.
Secondly, any “positive" theory of constitutional design crucially relies on the details
of the bargaining process between the parties while with our normative approach we are
able to generate results which do not rely on anything else other than the veil of igno-
rance assumption. Finally, a normative approach provides a benchmark against which
actual outcomes might be measured: as we shall argue below there is ample anecdotal
evidence that many of the constitutional mechanisms highlighted here can be found in
actual constitutions.
4. Optimal Constitutions
4.1. Constitutions with Majority Rules
We begin our analysis by considering the following class of mechanisms:
Deﬁnition 1 A Majority-Rule (MR) constitution is a number m ∈ [0,1] such that
x =
½
Ai f v ≥ m
B otherwise
where v is the proportion of individuals who vote in favor of policy A.
Thus, a MR constitution does not make any use of the information conveyed by the
variable c: as we shall see this below this is of crucial importance. Also, since only two
possibilities exist, we assume without any loss of generality that voting is sincere so that
v = p. Given this, for the rest of the paper we use p instead of v whenever there is no risk
8of confusion between the two. It is important to note that this class of constitution is sole
focus of much of the recent literature on constitutional rules (e.g. [1], [2], [7]).
We proceed by determining the optimal MR constitution of our decision problem. To
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The problem tells us that if A obtains (which means p ≥ m), then the constitutional
designer can expect utility w with probability p and −y with probability (1 − p),s u b j e c t
to the fact that c ≤ θ while she will get w with probability p and −z with probability
(1 − p) if c>θ .If B obtains (which means p<m ), then the designer gets utility zero for
sure.
The solution to the problem is the following:




z − G(θ)(z − y)
(w + z) − G(θ)(z − y)
Further, m∗














1 − mF(m) − e F (1 − m)
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1 − mF(m) − e F (1 − m)
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The ﬁrst order condition gives us m∗
MR(θ,w,z,y) while the second order condition is
everywhere
−[G(θ)(w + y)+( 1− G(θ))(w + z)] < 0
which means that the function is strictly concave in m and proves that m∗
MR is a unique
maximum for problem 1. The rest of the results follows by simple diﬀerentiation and by
taking limits. ¤
The optimal MR mechanism has some interesting properties. Firstly, as we would ex-
pect, if potential losses under A (−y or −z) increase, it gets more diﬃcult to pass policy
9while if potential gains (w) increase, it gets easier. Less intuitively, perhaps, the constitu-
tion is decreasing in θ and this because if θ increases, the probability of incurring heavy
losses (−z) vs. smaller losses (−y) decreases and that makes A more appealing ex-ante.
Finally, the optimal MR constitution is independent of the distribution F.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
this is because the constitution sets out conditions under which A should be chosen over
B (and vice-versa) and these must be independent of the probability that such condition
obtain.
Given that the purpose of this work is to go one step further than determining the
optimal constitution of a certain type by determining which type of constitutions are best
from a normative viewpoint, the following benchmarks will be useful:
Deﬁnition 2 Ac o n s t i t u t i o ni sex-ante eﬃcient if behind the veil of ignorance, society
prefers the constitution to the status quo B for sure. A constitution is ex-post eﬃcient
if after the realization of p and c society prefers the constitution to the status quo B for
sure.
Obviously, ex-post eﬃciency will imply ex-ante eﬃciency but not vice-versa. Given
these deﬁnitions, we have
Corollary 1 m∗
MR is ex-ante eﬃcient but not ex-post eﬃcient.
Proof. Clearly ex-ante eﬃciency applies here because B can be guaranteed just by setting
m =1but proposition 1 shows that the unique maximum is m∗
MR which in turn implies
that for any individual in society, EU (m∗
MR) >E U(1) = 0. On the other hand, ex-post
eﬃciency requires that if c ≤ θ then A obtains iﬀ pw − (1 − p)y ≥ 0 while if c>θthen A
obtain iﬀ pw − (1 − p)z ≥ 0. But to guarantee the ﬁrst condition would require











such that A obtains while pw − (1 −
p)y<0 and if m>
y





such that B obtains even though








z+w so that ex-post
eﬃciency does not obtain. ¤
104.2. Constitutions with Supermajority Rules
We have established that MR constitutions cannot achieve ex-post eﬃciency which leads
us to ask whether we can ﬁnd an alternative class of constitutions which might satisfy
this condition. The proof of corollary 1 shows that a constitution that satisﬁes ex-post
eﬃciency should have the property that the majority rule be
y
y+w whenever c ≤ θ and the
majority rule be z
z+w if c>θ .In this section, we consider another class of constitutional
rules and show that the optimal constitution within this class is ex-post eﬃcient. We have:
Deﬁnition 3 A Supermajority-Rule (SM) constitution is a triplet (m,s,d) with a ma-




Ai f((p ≥ m) ∧ (c ≤ s)) ∨ (p ≥ d)
B otherwise
This class of constitutions makes full use of the information provided by the collective
decision problem. The information is used by stating that if p is large enough (i.e. greater
than d) then the policy is passed regardless of the losses that losers will have, but if these
losses are not large, then a smaller majority (i.e. p ≥ m) will suﬃce. Clearly, for any
s, MR constitutions are a special case of SM constitutions where d = m. Note that the
requirement that d ≥ m is imposed for consistency: if d<m ,then m becomes irrelevant.
Crucially for SM constitutions to be applicable, we must assume that c be observable
and veriﬁable by the courts. We will discuss this point further below. To ﬁnd the optimal
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R b
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The solution is given by
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1 − mF(m) − e F (1 − m)
´






1 − dF(d) − e F (1 − d)
´






1 − dF(d) − e F (1 − d)
´







It is easy to see that the problem as a unique maximum for m at
y
y+w. Consider now d.
The FOC is
G(θ − s)[y − d(w + y)] + (1 − G(θ))[z − d(w + z)] = 0
which gives a unique solution
d(s)=
G(θ − s)y +( 1− G(θ))z
G(θ − s)(w + y)+( 1− G(θ))(w + z)
while the SOC
−G(θ − s)(w + y) − (1 − G(θ))(w + z) < 0
shows that this solution is also unique. Consider now the ﬁrst derivative with respect to



























1 − d(s)F(d(s)) − e F (1 − d(s))
´













y+w for any s and (pw − (1 − p)y) > 0 for any p>
y
y+w which means that




which proves our result for the case in which s ≤ θ. For the other case, an analogous proof
applies giving us the desired result ¤
From the proposition above, the following is immediate.










12Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows immediately by noting that with the optimal SM consti-
tution, A will obtain iﬀ p ≥
y
y+w whenever c ≤ θ while it will obtain iﬀ p ≥ z
z+w whenever




unique solution to the maximization problem 2 while m∗
MR is equivalent to (m∗
MR,s,m ∗
MR)
which is sub-optimal in the problem 2 ¤
Figure 1 below shows expected utilities for the optimal SM and MR constitutions as a
function of z.
Figure 1 here
As the ﬁgure clearly shows, expected utility with a majoritarian constitution, expected
utility tends to zero as z increases. This is because m∗
MR tends to one as z goes to inﬁnity.
So with a majoritarian constitution, a large losses for A whenever c>θmake it very
diﬃc u l tt op a s sp o l i c ye v e nw h e nl o s s e sf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hc ≤ θ are relatively small.
On the other hand, supermajoritarian constitutions can distinguish between the two kinds















The constitution presented above, rely on the observability and veriﬁability of the random
variables p and c. In other words, if these mechanism are to be used, an independent
court system has to be able to ascertain the realizations of p and c. The observability and
veriﬁability of these variables is necessary because otherwise losers would always have an
incentive to claim that p is smaller or c is greater than they actually whenever A should
obtain while winners would have the incentive to do the opposite. A natural question
that arises then, is to what extent observability and veriﬁability are possible in reality.
Democratic societies have developed, through elections and referenda, a fairly reliable way
of determining whether a certain majority of society is in favor of certain policies or not.
I nt h ec a s eo fe l e c t i o n s ,d i ﬀerent electoral rules are more or less capable of representing
society’s true preferences, but the choice of less reliable electoral rules (such as majoritarian
rules) can be ascribed to reasons outside of the simple setup of this paper: for example,
it is often claimed that majoritarian electoral rules can generate more executive stability
in parliamentary systems because of Duverger’s law.4 Thus, at a fundamental level, the
assumption that p is veriﬁable in a democracy, is quite mild.
4A c c o r d i n gt oD u v e r g e r ’ sl a w ,ﬁrst-past-the-post systems, tend to generate two-party legislatures.
13With respect to c, however, things are quite diﬀerent. In our setup, one interpretation
is that c controls individuals’ utilities in case A is passed so that veriﬁability would require
that these individuals (the losers in our setup) be able to provide veriﬁable information
about their utility. In many cases, this is not a realistic assumption so that only constitu-
tions that rely on p, such as the constitution m∗
MR can be designed. Indeed much of the
most recent literature (e.g. [1], [2], [7]) has focused on constitutions as majority rules for
this reason.
While we agree with the basic premise that it is indeed impossible to design constitu-
tions where majority rules are designed in accordance with the utilities of the winners and
losers for each policy, we believe that there are, for example, policy areas where the cost of
losing is always especially signiﬁcant. Thus, we argue that to the extent that some policy
areas are clearly deﬁned (and thus observable and veriﬁable), special majority rules that
pertain to them can be speciﬁed in the constitution.
As an illustration, consider the following simple extension of our setup. Imagine that
alternative policies A(c) diﬀer by the dis-utility that they give to losers while winners










−y1 if c ≤ θ1
−y2 θ1 <c≤ θ2
−y3 θ2 <c
where a<θ 1 <θ 2 <band y1 <y 2 <y 3. Suppose further that it is possible to verify
whether c>θ 2 or not but that it isn’t possible to verify whether θ1 <c≤ θ2 or c ≤ θ1.
For example, if c ≤ θ1,t h e nw eh a v es o m eﬁscal policy, if θ1 <c≤ θ2 we have some
diﬀerent ﬁscal policy, while if c>θ 2, the policy limits some fundamental freedoms. While
i tm a yb ev e r yd i ﬃcult to determine ex-ante which of the ﬁscal policies will generate losses
−y1 and which −y2, it is clearly much easier to assume that more losses will occur to any
individual who loses some fundamental liberty. Thus, an optimal constitutional response
to this problem would be to have a constitution
(m,s,d)=
µ
G(θ2)y2 − G(θ1)(y2 − y1)





where a majority rule that takes the ﬁscal policies into account coexists with a superma-
jority rule for dealing with fundamental freedoms.5
Actual constitutions seem to map well with our argument: while there is a majority
of policy areas for which it is diﬃcult to identify ex-ante which will provide smaller or
greater losses, there are policy areas for which gains and losses are easily identiﬁable as
being greater or smaller than usual and for which special decision rules are devised. The
5The proof of this result follows immediately from the proofs of propositions 1 and 2.
14advantages of such constitutions are clear: if in some society some policy areas are speciﬁ-
cally delicate and these policy areas are easily to identify and veriﬁable, supermajoritarian
constitutions allow for the creation of special policy making rules for those areas without
necessarily making all policy-making decisions diﬃcult.
[insert some examples from real constitutions here].
5. Optimal Constitutional Change
In this section we slightly modify our previous setup to allow for the possibility that a crisis
arises if the probability that a high-loss policy can be implemented is large enough. As in
the previous section, we investigate possible constitutions in this setting and we show that
if the probability that a crisis obtains is large enough, constitutions with constitutional
amendments can be optimal.
Our original setup is modiﬁed as follows: after the constitutional decision is made
but before policies are implemented, nature selects a state of nature ω ∈ {ω,ω} with
γ =P r( ω = ω). We interpret the state of nature ω as meaning that there is no possibility
of a crisis, in which case everything is as in the previous section, while if ω obtains, there is
a possibility of a crisis. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a ti fω obtains then there exists a value
ψ with θ ≤ ψ ≤ b such that if with the constitution that is used to determine policy, there
is positive probability that a policy A obtains with c>ψ ,then losers will choose to have
a constitutional crisis. If this occurs, the crisis is successful and the outcome is B with
probability (1 −α) and is not successful and the outcome is decided by the constitutional
rules with probability α. We will discuss this setup further below.
The timeline, then, is as follows:
1. Constitution is chosen behind veil of ignorance
2. Nature selects ω, w h i c hi so b s e r v e db ye v e r y o n ea n dp.
3. Given p,t h es e t sW and W C are determined.
4. If ω = ω and the current constitution gives a positive probability to a policy with
c>ψto obtain, then we have a crisis: nature determines if it is successful. If it is,
then B obtains and the process ends. If it isn’t successful, then we go to step 4.
5. Nature selects c which is observed by everyone.
6. Individuals vote for or against A. The result of the vote is observed by everyone.
7. The policy x is determined according to the constitution.6
6As mentioned before, the fact that here c is selected after nature determines the sets W and WC
would also work in the framework of section 3, so that there is no inconsistency between the two setups.
15The timing here is more crucial than in the previous setup. While the collective decision
problem we describe is literally a one-shot problem, real constitutions have to deal with
many policy decisions on a daily basis. What this timeline represents is, in reduced form, a
dynamic setup where once the constitution is chosen, several policy decision are made that
constitute a speciﬁc program so that what we term policies A and B should be interpreted
as a bundle of decisions which may diﬀer in their cost to losers (that is, may diﬀer because
of their value c) but generate the same set of winners and losers. Thus, the interpretation
is that if c>θ , the program will include policies which are particularly costly to losers.
The assumption that c is revealed after W and W C are determined only means that the
exact details of this program are unknown at the time in which people know whether
the program will favor them or not. In this context, our interpretation of ω is that it
captures the notion that losers may or may not be in a position to resist the enactment of
a program which can potentially be disastrous for them. Implicit in this interpretation is
the argument that in any society the relative strength of diﬀerent sides in not necessary
captured just by p (how many individuals are on each side) but may be distorted in one
way or another. For example, we could have that while a certain side has the numbers to
enact a certain program of policies, the other side has particularly strong interest groups
or even a credible threat of recourse to violence that allows them to threaten a crisis. If
one such case occurs, i.e. if ω = ω, then we capture the extent to which this is a real
threat through the exogenous parameters ψ and α. The ﬁrst measures how losers trade-oﬀ
the risk of getting a really bad policy as opposed to beneﬁts of a crisis while the second is
an inverse measure of the probability of success of a crisis.7
The main point of the whole setup, however, is that ω will generally not be veriﬁable.
While each side’s relative size can be measured by p through mechanisms such referenda
or elections, what makes for the actual strength of each side and its ability to threaten
each other will be perhaps easy to recognize but cannot be easily described and cannot be
therefore be part of a constitution. [include examples such as the vulnerability of French
governments to strikes here]
5.1. Optimal Constitutions when ω is veriﬁable
Situations of instability, which is what ω captures here, while easily observable, will mostly
be unveriﬁable. However, in this subsection, we study the optimal constitution when ω is
veriﬁable to provide a benchmark for the analysis of the unveriﬁable case below. We also
7I nt h em o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tp and ω are drawn independently by nature and we also impose no
connection between α and ψ. These assumptions, given the discussion above, are not particularly realistic:
for example, it would be reasonable to assume that p and ω be negatively correlated because sheers
numbers are important in democracies. However, this would complicate the model excessively and would
not change our results in a signiﬁcant way.
16assume that c is veriﬁable. In order to proceed we need to slightly generalize our deﬁnition
of SM constitutions:
Deﬁnition 4 A Generalized Supermajority-Rule (GSM) constitution is a quadruple (m,s,d,t)




Ai f((p ≥ m) ∧ (c ≤ s)) ∨ ((p ≥ d) ∧ (c ≤ t))
B otherwise
Thus, we slightly changed the deﬁnition to allow for an additional veto rule even when
p ≥ d. This generalization was redundant in our previous setup since whenever the chances
of a crisis are zero, it is always optimal to set t = b. Veriﬁability implies that a ω−dependent
constitution can be designed for each of the possible realization of ω so that the problem
faced behind the veil of ignorance is








EU (m,s,d,t) if (s ∧ t) ≤ ψ
αEU (m,s,d,t) if (s ∨ t) >ψ
¤
T os a v es p a c ew ew i l ln o wu s et h en o t a t i o n :
∆ = G(θ)
·
















The following proposition follows immediately:
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8EU (m,s,d,t) is too cumbersome to write extensively here but it is a natural extension of the expres-
sion described in problem 2.
17Proof. The statement with regard to the case ω = ω is straightforward as it follows the
pattern developed in the proof of proposition 2. Consider now the case ω = ω. The nature
of the problem implies that either a constitution guarantees no crisis or a successful crisis
will happen with probability (1 − α). Thus the optimal constitution that guarantees no







as a unique solution. On the other hand, the best constitution
that will trigger a successful crisis with probability (1 − α) is again, uniquely, the standard
constitution because any other constitution that triggers a crisis will have the resulting




































which is what we were looking for ¤
This is a clear benchmark for us because it tells us what the optimal constitution is
when the ﬂexibility to adjust the constitution for diﬀerent realizations of ω exists and this
from the perspective of the original position which implies that this is the decision that a
social planner will make. In particular, the cut-oﬀ point α indicates the point at which,
conditional on ω obtaining, it is optimal for the constitutional designer to switch from one
possibility to the other. If ω in not veriﬁable, then clearly this trade-oﬀ cannot be made
conditional on ω obtaining.
5.2. Optimal Constitutions when ω is not veriﬁable
The clear consequence of unveriﬁability of ω is that a ω-contingent constitution is not
available any more. This means that constitutional designer actually face the following
problem:





EU (m,s,d,t) if (s ∧ t) ≤ ψ
(αγ +( 1− γ))EU (m,s,d,t) if (s ∨ t) >ψ
¤
A simple comparison of problem 3 with problem 4 already shows intuitively that the
diﬀerence between the two problems is not just that the optimal constitution cannot be
made contingent on ω but also that conditional on ω obtaining, the trade-oﬀ between
choosing a “safe" constitution with t = ψ and a “risky" one with t = b is diﬀerent. Indeed
we have:


































γ (Λ − ∆)
< α
Proof. Just as we argued in the proof of proposition 3, the unique optimal constitution






while the unique optimal constitution that al-






. Thus , from the original po-












if either ω obtains (which occurs with
probability (1 − γ)) or if ω obtains but the crisis is not successful (which happens with






will be chosen iﬀ












´ ⇔ α ≥ 1 −
(1 − G(ψ))Λ
γ (Λ − ∆)
N o wt os h o wt h a tα<α we ﬁrst notice that
α − α =
Λ(1 − γ)(1− G(ψ))
γ (Λ − ∆)
where we need to study the sign of Λ and Λ − ∆. Consider Λ ﬁrst. Note that








which is always true. Since









and we know the latter is ex-ante eﬃcient, then Λ − ∆ is also strictly positive which
completes the proof ¤







will be chosen, regardless of the realization of ω. Now, since
α<α as well, there is no loss in case ω o b t a i n s ,( a si nb o t hc a s e st = ψ) but if ω
obtains, then there is a loss because the UV constitution still imposes t∗
UV = ψ whereas






we have the opposite problem: there is no loss whenever ω obtains
(as both constitutions set optimally t = b) but there is a loss if ω obtains because the
UV constitution imposes t∗
UV = b even though the probability of a successful crisis is now
relatively high and t∗
V = ψ. As we’ve mentioned before, this occurs because it is impossible
for the constitutional designer to replicate the veriﬁable case as it doesn’t know for sure
what the realization of ω is. This analysis leads us to ask whether we can ﬁnd constitutions
of a diﬀerent nature that can help bridge the gap imposed by unveriﬁability. We argue
below that constitutions that allow for constitutional amendment can provide a (partial)
answer.
5.3. Optimal Constitutions with Amendment Rules
The main problem highlighted by the analysis above is that unveriﬁability leads to a lack
of ﬂexibility in the constitution which cannot be adjusted depending on the realization
of ω. One way out of the problem would be to allow the constitution to be renegotiated
between all individuals after ω is observed. This is not possible in our setup, however,
because individuals already know whether they are winners or losers and have contrasting
incentives in the constitution to be designed so that unanimity cannot be achieved. The
best we can do is to give one of the sides a monopoly decision over a new constitution,
provided this side represents enough individuals. In other words, we propose an amendment
rule. Note that this adds a few steps between step 3 and step 4 in our timeline as follows:
3a. Winners propose a (possibly) new constitution to the original constitution chosen in
period 1.
3b. If the proposal diﬀers from the original constitutions, individuals vote for or against
the proposed change.
3c. The amendment rule in the old constitution determines whether the new constitution
is implemented or not.
Formally, a constitution with these features is then
Deﬁnition 5 An Amendable (AM) constitution is a triplet (m,s,r) with a majority rule
m ∈ [0,1], av e t or u l es ∈ [a,b], a n da na m e n d m e n tr u l er ∈ [m,1] such that if
p ≥ rt h e nx =
½
Ai f((p ≥ m) ∧ (c ≤ s))
Bo t h e r w i s e
while if
p<r t h e n x=
½
Ai f((p ≥ m) ∧ (c ≤ s))
B otherwise
where m and s are chosen by a representative winner.
20The deﬁnition highlights two extremely important things: the ﬁr s ti st h a tt h i si sn o t
a ω-dependent mechanism. This is crucial because, as we shall see in detail below, AM
constitutions are in general not outcome-equivalent to any GSM constitution unless ω is
veriﬁable. This then provides a normative justiﬁcation for amendment rules in the realistic
case in which ω is unveriﬁable, provided AM constitutions outperform GSM constitutions.
As we shall see, this turn out to be indeed the case. Also note that AM constitutions
take the notion of constitutional amendment seriously, in the sense that the amendment
rule does not have policy implications directly but only through an actual change in
the constitutional rules. This is precisely why GSM constitutions and AM constitutions
generate, in general, diﬀerent outcomes.
The problem for this particular case can be written as
Problem 5 Let
(m,s)=a r gm a x
m≤r,s
½
G(s)wi f s ≤ ψ
αG(s)wi fs>ψ
Also, let EU (m,s,1,b) the expected utility for a GSM constitution. Then the prob-
lem is
max
m,s,r [(1 − r)EU (m,s,1,b)+rEU (m,s,1,b)]
¤
The problem says that if p ≥ r, then winners have a free hand in determining a new
majority and veto rule. We assume that, knowing that p ≥ r whenever they do get to
choose, they will never choose a m>rt h u sr i s k i n gt ol o s eA. Given that, they will
c h o o s eav e t or u l es where the only eﬀective constraint is that for s>ψac r i s i sm i g h tb e
triggered. At time 1., given this behavior, a designer in the original position then has to
choose (m,s,r).
Given this, we have:
























bi f(ω = ω) ∨ ((ω = ω) ∧ (α ≥ e α))
ψi f (ω = ω) ∧ (α<e α)
9While the AM optimal constitution is unique, all values of m ≤ r∗
AM are optimal for reasons we have
already discussed.
21where
e α = G(ψ)
Proof. Consider the optimal behavior for winners conditional on p ≥ r.G i v e nt h ec h o s e n
r they will set any m that satisﬁes the constraint m ≤ r and set s = ψ if ω = ω (which
they can observe) and αG(b)w = αw < G(ψ)w and s = b in all other cases. This is
because if ω = ω there can be no crisis and the probability of getting w is maximized
by setting s = b. If ω = ω setting s = b will still be the optimal way to maximize the
chance of getting w except that the then a crisis is triggered and so payoﬀs only obtain
with probability α. The best way to avoid a crisis is then to set s = ψ but that of course
only gets w with probability G(ψ). Hence the optimal choice s∗.
Given this, at time 1, the problem is equivalent to maximizing the following problem.




If ω = ω then the problem is
max
m,s,r EU (m,s,r,b)




otherwise. But these maximization problems are all identical to problem 2 with the excep-
tion of the last one which just diﬀers by the fact that ψ replaces b in the problem. Thus,
applying the proof in proposition 2, we have the desired result ¤
It is easy to see that the optimal AM constitution is equivalent to the ω-dependent
GSM constitution
(mEQ,s EQ,d EQ,t EQ)(ω)=

   


















if (ω = ω) ∧ (α<e α)
which diﬀers from the optimal ω-dependent GSM constitution only because the cut-oﬀ
value α is replaced by e α. The following corollary then allows us to provide some compar-
isons:
Corollary 3 We have that















































Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows immediately by showing that ∆ > 0. The sign of ∆ is
then determined by the sign of the expression


























To prove that this is always true, we need to check under which conditions the following






Let Ω = e F (x1) and assume that F (x2)=F(x1). Then







⇔ Ω >x 1F(x1)
which is impossible. If F (x2) >F (x1), then the situation above is modiﬁed only by the
fact that
e F (x2) > Ω + F(x1)(x2 − x1)
which means that the impossibility described above is further reinforced. So, ∆ is always
positive. The comparative statics results obtain by diﬀerentiating the relevant expressions
[Note: we have the actual values of these derivatives, so that we also know their relative
size: should we add this? Also, comparative statics with respect to w are to do]. ¤
The most important result of this subsection is that even AM constitutions cannot fully
replicate the optimal ω-dependent GSM constitution and this is simply because the former
has the same ﬂexibility of the latter but that comes at the cost of allowing just winners, not
a social planner, to modify the constitution. Equally interesting is the fact that the bias
goes in the opposite direction than that generated by the optimal UV constitution. The
23bias can be explained by the fact that diﬀerent forces are at work. With UV constitutions,
the decision to set t = b comes at too low a level of α because there is uncertainty as
to whether ω obtains or not. In other words, if the decision to switch from t = ψ to
t = b was done at α instead of α, the alignment with the V constitution conditional on ω
obtaining would be more than negatively compensated by the fact that in case ω obtains,
the constitution is suboptimal for a larger range of values of α. With AM constitutions,
instead, this problem is completely resolved but as just mentioned another problem comes
in in that while the constitution is ﬂexible to the diﬀerent realizations of ω,t h a tﬂexibility
puts the decision in the hands of winners, not social planners. Winners are biased in the
sense that they are more keen to obtain A than individuals in the original position are.
This means that they take the threat of a successful crisis more seriously and are therefore
more reluctant to choose s = b for a given value of α than individuals in the original
position are to set t = b in a V constitution. [add comparative statics discussion].
5.4. Discussion
In this section we extended the model of the previous section to allow for the possibility
that unveriﬁable events occur between the time the constitution is chosen and policy
decisions have to be made. What we wished to represent is the notion that in reality, A is
a program supported by a group of individuals which consists of a bundle of alternatives
to the status quo. In this context, c represents the event in which the program will have
policies that are particularly negative for the opponents of the program. The unveriﬁable
events that matter here are that, in contrast to the previous section, there is a possibility
that losers from the enactment of the program have the power to stop the constitutional
process.
Thus, we investigated what the optimal response to this problem might be. We have
shown that a fundamental trade-oﬀ exists between the beneﬁt of having enough ﬂexibility
to respond to changes in ω and the identity of the designer of the constitution. Speciﬁcally,
UV constitution are chosen in the original position so that they are representative of
society’s choices as a whole but do not have the ﬂexibility to respond to changes in ω.T h e
alternative is to have constitutions with amendment rules. These do provide the required
ﬂexibility because they can be changed in response to changes in ω but this comes at
t h ec o s to fh a v i n gt ol e to n es p e c i ﬁcs i d e ,t h ew i n n e r s ,m a k et h ec h a n g e ss ot h a tt h en e w
constitution is diﬀerent from the constitution that would be decided in the original position
(i.e. a constitution V).
Note however, that if α was known ex-ante, i.e. at time 1., a constitutional designer
could solve the unveriﬁability problem entirely by choosing a UV constitution if α ≥ α
a n da nA Mc o n s t i t u t i o ni fα<α because UV constitutions only create problems only if
24α<α while AM constitutions only create problems if α ∈ [α, e α).10 This gives us some
sort of “comparative statics" for constitutional structures that map well with our intuition:
if α is high the possibility of a successful crisis is low which means that the cost of the
rigidity that comes with UV constitutions is zero because whatever the realization of ω
the optimal constitution is the same. On the other hand, with AM constitutions, the
cost of the disalignment of preferences between winners and individuals in the original
position might still be there even if α is relatively high (i.e. if α ∈ [α,e α)) because winners
are more concerned about crises than individuals in the original position. If α is low the
costs of rigidity that come with UV constitutions are high because the diﬀerence between
the case ω = ω and ω = ω is now signiﬁcant. This means that now ﬂexibility is more
important and AM constitutions perform better. The resulting message of all this is that
constitutions should be more ﬂexible if constitutional designers expect future instability
to be particularly high.
One more point is worth mentioning: the analysis of this section crucially hinges on the
notion that c is veriﬁable, which, we argued in the previous section, cannot always be taken
for granted. If c is not veriﬁable, we’ve shown that only MR constitutions are possible.
But then, the choice of an amendment rules becomes meaningless: any rule r that allowed
am a j o r i t yr u l em t ob ec h a n g e d ,w o u l db eh a v et ob ee q u a lt om itself and therefore
redundant. To see that note that if r<m ,then m is redundant because whenever p ≥ r
then m can be changed by winners to r thus making r the eﬀective majority rule. On the
other hand, with a MR constitution, A obtains whenever p ≥ m so that any rule r>m
would be redundant: the only reason for winners to use r would be to reduce m in order
to make A easier but if p ≥ r is satisﬁed, then p>mas well and so that there is never a
need for r.
What this means is that constitutional amendments, as mechanisms to modify other
constitutional rules, make no sense if these other rules only depend on the realization of p
because constitutional amendments are mechanisms that depend on p themselves. To make
sense of constitutional amendment you need to have constitutions which include rules which
d e p e n do nt h er e a l i z a t i o no fo t h e rv a r i a b l e s( w h i c hh a v et ob eo b s e r v a b l ea n dv e r i ﬁable).
In our simple setup, c is such a variable and many more may be described by more
complex settings, but the main point is that by describing constitutions as mechanisms
that depend only on realization of p (as much of the recent literature does), a meaningful
theory of constitutional change cannot be provided.
[We might want to have one more point related to this is the confusion in much of
the literature between supermajority and amendment rules (e.g. Boudroux and Prichard)
which may be explained by the fact that for α =1(i.e. eﬀectively the setup in section 4),
10If α ≥ e α then V, UV and AM constitutions are the same so the choice of constitution between UV
and AM is in any case optimal and therefore irrelevant.
25AM and SM constitutions are equivalent]
6. Optimal Constitutions with Heterogeneity
The recent literature in political economics has put a signiﬁcant emphasis on the im-
portance of checks and balances as an instrument to reduce the agency problem between
politicians and citizens (see especially [8] for a fundamental contribution in this regard). In
this section we again slightly modify our original setup to study another sort of checks and
balances which do not arise from the agency problem mentioned above but from possible
heterogeneities between individuals that arise at a interim stage, after the constitution has
been chosen but before p and c are determined. To clarify things, note that we can con-
ceivably have heterogeneity between individuals at the ex-ante stage, at an interim stage,
and at the ex-post stage. In sections 3 to 5, we dealt with a setup where we had ex-post
heterogeneity, in the sense that heterogeneity between individuals only came about when
nature determined whether individuals were winners or losers.
Here, instead, we deal with the case in which before nature determines winners and
losers, but after a constitution is chosen, nature makes a ﬁrst selection of individuals in
two categories. Speciﬁcally, we will look at two diﬀerent possibilities:
i. Nature determines that any eventual loser, conditional on c>θobtaining, will get
losses −z1 with some probability and losses −z2 with complementary probability.
ii. Nature determines that for any individual there is a probability that the distribu-
tion function for p is F1 (p) and a complementary probability that the distribution
function for p is F2 (p).
The interpretation for case i. is that from the original position perspective individuals
do not know whether they will be winners or losers but they know that, conditional on
c>θobtaining, some losers will have losses −z1 and the rest losses −z2. The interpretation
for case ii. is that from the original position perspective, individuals know that their
probability of being winners or losers is determines can be determined by one of two
diﬀerent distributions. The corresponding notions of ex-ante heterogeneity are:
iii. Before the constitution is chosen, it is common knowledge that conditional on c>θ
obtaining, some individuals will get losses −z1 if they turn out to be losers while the
other individuals will get losses −z2 in the corresponding case
iv. Before the constitution is chosen, it is common knowledge that the distribution
function for p is F1 (p) for some individuals and that it is F2 (p) for the others.
26Ideally, we would like to be able to study cases iii. and iv. but if we did, we could not
use the original position device. Thus, we study cases i. and ii., where instead of knowing
for sure in which of the groups they belong to before the constitution is chosen, individuals
only know that they belong to either of them with some probability so that we still have
ex-ante homogeneity. This still allows us to draw parallels with cases iii. and iv. For
example, in the analysis below, we will show that if there is enough heterogeneity, checks
and balances constitutions will be preferable to simple constitutions because they provide
protection for the most disadvantaged group and in the original position individuals want
to make sure the constitution does not penalize them too much in case they belong to
the disadvantaged group. This is analogous to saying that in cases iii. or iv., members
of disadvantaged groups accept to participate in the constitution for a whole society only
if the constitution provides them enough checks and balances. We will reconsider these
parallels at the end of the section.
Given this setup, we assume that simple constitutions and constitutions with checks
and balances are available. With the former, the constitutional rules apply to the whole
of society while with the latter group-speciﬁcr u l e sa r ea v a i l a b l e . A sw i t ht h ep r e v i o u s
sections, the notion of veriﬁability is crucial. If the heterogeneity was not veriﬁable, then
only simple constitutions would be available. We assume that heterogeneity is captured by









= q and given the discussion above, we assume that as soon
as h becomes observable, it is also veriﬁable.
With these assumptions, we have a timeline identical to our original timeline except
for the fact that h is also selected and before p is determined:
1. Constitution is chosen behind veil of ignorance
2. Nature selects h which is observable by everyone
3. Nature selects c and p where the former is observable by everyone.
4. Given p,t h es e t sW and W C are determined.
5. Individuals vote for or against A. The result of the vote is observed by everyone.
6. The policy x is determined according to the constitution.
In the rest of the section, we will study simple vs. checks and balances constitutions
in this setup for 3 diﬀerent scenarios:








−z1 if h = h






2 for both c veriﬁable and unveriﬁable.




= q 6= 1
2 and c is veriﬁable
III. Case ii. in which
if h = h then Fi(p)=F1 (p)
if h = h then Fi(p)=F2 (p)
for some speciﬁc distributions F1 (p) and F2 (p) and c is veriﬁable.
Note that as with p, given that there is a continuum of individuals and that draws for
h are independent, q represents the fraction of individuals in society for which h = h.
6.1. Heterogeneity in Costs with Symmetric Groups
We now consider the ﬁrst of our scenarios as described above. We assume w.l.o.g. that
z1 <z 2 so that individuals for which h = h will be disadvantaged compared to individuals
for whom h = h. The veriﬁability of the variable h allows us to consider the random
variable p1, the proportion of winners amongst the advantaged and p2, the proportion of
winners amongst the disadvantaged.
One important change we also have to make is that in order to provide solutions in
closed form, we need to make speciﬁc assumptions on the distributions F (p) and G(c).
In particular we assume they are both uniforms on [0,1] and [a,b] respectively. Finally,
just to keep the algebra simple, we let w = y. We start with the case in which c is not
veriﬁable:




Ai fp 1 + p2 ≥ 2m
B otherwise





Ai f(p1 ≥ m1) ∧ (p2 ≥ m2)
B otherwise
28The diﬀerence between the two constitutions is clear enough: with a SMR constitution,
all that matters is that on average society be in favor (or not) of A while with checks and
balances, we need that A achieve a majority in both groups. Given these deﬁnitions then,
our problems become:
Problem 6 Deﬁne the following objects:
ui = piw − (1 − pi)w
















   






































 if m < 1
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The problem above leads immediately to the following:




(z1 + z2)(b − θ)+2 w(θ − a)







for z1 + z2 > 2w, m∗




a > 0. There is also a









(3θ − 2a − b)w +( b − θ)3z1
3((b + θ − 2a)w +( b − θ)z1)
,
(3θ − 2a − b)w +( b − θ)3z2








for zj >w ,increasing in zj,b,aand decreasing in θ. Finally, m∗
1 <m ∗
2.
Proof. The result follows from the usual maximization procedure which shows that the
objective functions are strictly concave functions of m, m1 and m2 respectively while the
comparative statics are straightforward ¤
For the purposes of comparison between the two cases, we then get:
29Corollary 4 A CBMR constitution is preferable to a SMR constitution iﬀ
z2 > z2 =
(b + θ − 2a)w +2 ( b − θ)z1
b − θ
>z 1
where z2 is increasing in z1 and θ while it is decreasing in a and b.
Proof. The result follows from the analyzing the expression
EU (m
∗
CBMR) − EU (m
∗














w2(4a(a − b − θ)+( b + θ)2) − 2z1(b − θ)2
+wz1(b2 − θ




2 − 2a(b − a))w +5 z1(b − θ)
2
C = −2(b − θ)
2 < 0









−(b + θ − 2a)w +( b − θ)z1
2(b − θ)
.
We note that z2
2 <z 1 <z 1
2 and that C<0. This implies that for z2 >z 1
2,w eg e tt h a t
EU (m∗
CBMR)−EU (m∗
SMR) > 0 and for z2 ∈ [z1,z1
2] we get EU (m∗
CBMR)−EU (m∗
SMR) ≤
0. The comparative statics are immediate ¤
Thus we get that checks and balances are only optimal if there is enough heterogeneity
in the system, in the sense that it is not suﬃcient that z2 be larger than z1 but the
diﬀerence needs to be signiﬁcant enough. To get some intuition for this result, suppose
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30where the ﬁrst is clearly smaller than the latter. Since for the homogeneous case the
optimal SMR constitution is the optimal MR constitution, CBMR must be suboptimal.
Intuitively, this is because checks and balances are redundant in the homogeneous case:
the optimal choice of m already makes sure that A is chosen whenever it is optimal to do
so from the original position’s perspective. If from this point of homogeneity, we just add
a negligible amount of heterogeneity, this will still not be enough to compensate.
A similar result to the one presented above applies to the case in which c is veriﬁable.
Clearly, since the heterogeneity only applies to the cases in which c>θ , we will contrast
simple supermajoritarian constitutions with constitutions where checks and balances only
apply to the supermajority rule. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 7 A Simple Supermajority rule (SSM) constitution is a triplet (m,s,d) with
m ∈ [0,1],s∈ [a,b],d∈ [m,1] such that
x =
½
Ai f((p1 + p2 ≥ 2m) ∧ (c ≤ s)) ∨ (p1 + p2 ≥ 2d)
B otherwise
A Supermajority-rule constitution with Checks and Balances (CBSM) is a quadruplet




Ai f((p1 + p2 ≥ 2m) ∧ (c ≤ s)) ∨ ((p1 ≥ d1) ∧ (p2 ≥ d2))
B otherwise
Since the problem to solve is extremely similar to problem 6 above, we will dispense
with that and immediately provide the corresponding, result:
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where the latter generates higher expected utility than the former whenever
z2 > z2 = w +2 z1
Proof. The maximization problem is again tedious but straightforward. Taking the










(b − θ)(w − z1 +2 z2)(z2 − 2z1 − w)w3
(b − a)(2w + z1 + z2)
2 (w + z2)(w + z1)
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(w − z1 +2 z2)(z2 − 2z1 − w)
These are zero if
2z
2
1 − wz2 − 5z1z2 − w
2 − wz1 +2 z
2
2 =0
We have two roots in z2: 1
2z1 − 1
2w and w +2 z1 where the solution is the second because
it is bigger than z1 and the result is proven ¤
Just as in the context where c was not veriﬁable, here too we have that a suﬃciently
high degree of heterogeneity is necessary before checks and balances become the optimal
constitutional structure. However
Corollary 5 z2 − z2 > 0 and it is increasing in w, the diﬀerence θ − a and decreasing in
the diﬀerence b − θ.
Proof. The diﬀerence z2 − z2 is
2(b − θ)
−1 (θ − a)w>0
¤
What this result essentially says is that the distortion that checks and balances provide
in the homogeneous case is smaller when c is veriﬁable. In other words, if z2 ∈ (z2,z2) and
if c is unveriﬁable, checks and balances would not be recommended because while they
might be useful conditionally on c>θ , they are negative enough if c ≤ θ to make the
overall case negative. In the same situation, when c is veriﬁable, there can be checks and
balances because they can be limited just to policies with c>θ .Clearly, as the set [a,θ]
expands (or [θ,b] shrinks), the distinction gets more pronounced.
6.2. Heterogeneity in Costs with Asymmetric Groups
This is similar to the case above but we only look at the c veriﬁable case and we consider
a generic q [TO DO]
6.3. Heterogeneity in the Probability of Being a Winner
This is case III above [TO DO]
326.4. Discussion
[INCOMPLETE] We have considered heterogeneity in various forms. In the ﬁrst subsec-
tion, we looked at the case in which heterogeneity takes the form that some individuals
will be eventually disadvantaged in terms of the losses they get if particularly some policies
are passed. We have shown that from the original position’s perspective, if this hetero-
geneity is particularly signiﬁcant, checks and balances might be called for. This is because
with them each group is eﬀectively granted veto power over the relevant policies (if c is
veriﬁable) or over policy making as a whole (if c is not veriﬁable). Given this, when the
representative individual decides which constitutional form to use will trade-oﬀ the fact
that if she happens to be in the disadvantaged group she will beneﬁt from checks and
balances with the fact that if she isn’t, there is a veto power that stops policy from being
enacted even if for society at large there is an ample majority in favor..
For example, with checks and balances we could have that if the majority required to
pass a certain policy is 1/4 for both groups, then if p2 = 1
5 the policy won’t pass even when
p1 = 9
10 so that 1
2 (p1 + p2)=11
20 > 1
2. Also we have shown that the trade-oﬀ is less severe
when c is veriﬁable on those issues where there is heterogeneity because policy areas where
there is no heterogeneity would not be aﬀected.
Another important point is that the interim-heterogeneity framework we’ve used can be
of guidance in thinking about the more realistic framework where heterogeneity occurs ex-
ante, before constitutional decisions are taken. In our framework, constitutional designers
might choose to use checks and balances because they fear they might end up in the
disadvantaged group. In a framework where this is determined before constitutions are
chosen, members of the disadvantaged group might be able to impose checks and balances
as a condition for joining the constitution itself, or as a condition for avoiding stability
in the system. [Examples of the ﬁrst case from EU, of other cases from diﬀerent ethnic
groups in countries such as Belgium. Raise the question: why there are few C&B for
certain clearly identiﬁable and veriﬁable groups in society (e.g. women, minorities), how
do they diﬀer from the case of ethnic groups in Belgium?]
7. Conclusions
[INCOMPLETE] In this paper we have developed a framework for analyzing optimal con-
stitutional design from a normative perspective. Contrary to much of the recent literature
on the issue, we have not focused on exogenously given constitutional mechanisms (e.g.
majority rules) and studied how they change with changes in speciﬁc parameters in the
environment, but we’ve studied what constitutional mechanisms are optimal responses to
the features of the environment. In particular, our results imply that majority rules are
33optimal mechanisms only to the extent that diﬀerent policy dimensions are not veriﬁable.
We argued that veriﬁability is instead possible in a signiﬁcant number of cases and that
this explains the frequent existence of more sophisticated mechanisms which includes veto
rules and supermajority rules.
We further extended the framework by showing that the issue of (un)veriﬁability plays
a crucial role in explaining constitutional amendment rules. More speciﬁcally we showed
that if the risks of instability to the system are signiﬁcant enough, then amendment rules
are capable of providing the ﬂexibility needed to deal with them while if these risks are not
signiﬁcantly high then that ﬂexibility comes as a liability because it allocates the monopoly
of constitutional decision to a speciﬁc part of society. We also argued that the issue of
constitutional amendment cannot be dealt with within the context of simple majoritarian
constitutions.
Finally, we looked at the issue of how constitutional structures can respond to hetero-
geneity amongst members of society and we have characterized under what conditions it is
optimal to have checks and balances in the sense of providing disadvantaged groups veto
powers over policy. We have shown that checks and balances are costly mechanisms that
should only be used when the heterogeneity is suﬃciently signiﬁcant. In addition, we have
shown how being able to verify the policy issues where heterogeneity occurs alleviates the
problem. [Add discussion of two missing sub-cases]
The collective decision problem we have described in this paper is extremely simple.
As mentioned above, the most obvious omissions is that we do not look at the agency
issues involved in the relationship between citizens and politicians and we do not have an
endogenous mechanism for developing policy proposal. A natural next step would then be
to incorporate some of these features in a more sophisticated framework to see how the
optimal constitutions would evolve in response to these features11.
A second potentially very interesting area for future research would be an analysis of the
issues from a positive perspective. As mentioned before this is not a simple task because
there is a danger that many results would not be robust the details of the constitutional
bargaining stage. Nevertheless, this is a necessary step if we wish to further understand
the nature of the basic foundations of democracies.
11[2] take a ﬁrst step in this direction by making the policy maker a politician who also cares about
private beneﬁts and can choose policies that provide him with private beneﬁts. The optimal majority
rules thus responds to the politician’s incentives.
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Figure 1. The thick line is EU(m∗




function of z, for w = y =1 ,a=0 ,θ=1 ,b=2and F,G uniform distributions.
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